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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3384 
___________ 
 
MALVA CUEVAS,           
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SECURITIZED TRUST GNR 2008-66; 
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA, as Servicer; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM; DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-06208) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 22, 2016 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Malva Cuevas appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing her 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
  In January 2013, Appellee JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) commenced a 
mortgage foreclosure action against Cuevas and her husband in the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, for the failure to make payments on a note and mortgage that Cuevas had 
executed with Chase on May 22, 2008.  The Superior Court granted a final judgment of 
foreclosure on July 30, 2014, after Cuevas and her husband failed to appear and defaulted 
the case. 
 Cuevas thereafter filed a complaint in the District Court against the Appellees on 
October 3, 2014, alleging various challenges to the foreclosure action.  The core 
allegation in Cuevas’ complaint was that Chase could not legally foreclose on the 
property that the mortgage secured because Chase had securitized the loan in a way that 
had extinguished its right to foreclose.   
 The three named Appellees moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and Cuevas did not respond.  The District Court 
thereafter granted the motion and dismissed Cuevas’ complaint for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In particular, the District Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
which prohibits federal actions that seek to improperly appeal state court judgments to 
the federal courts, barred Cuevas’ case because her complaint effectively sought to 
overturn the state foreclosure judgment.  This appeal followed. 
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 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order dismissing Cuevas’ 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 
529-30 (3d Cir. 2012).  We construe Cuevas’ pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may affirm the judgment on any basis that the 
record supports, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations . . . must be taken 
as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must 
be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quotation marks omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
 We will affirm.  We agree with the District Court that, to the extent that Cuevas 
complained of injuries caused by the state court foreclosure judgment and invited the 
Court to review it and reject it, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.  See Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow.  See id. at 167-69.  Construing 
Cuevas’ claims liberally, part of the conduct at stake was potentially pleaded to have 
occurred prior to the foreclosure action, and was potentially pleaded to have involved 
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conduct unrelated to Chase’s legal right to foreclose.  See id. at 167 (the timing of alleged 
conduct in relation to the state-court judgment is a “useful guidepost” in assessing 
whether Rooker-Feldman applies).  That said, to the extent Cuevas’ suit presented a 
claim that did not directly attack the state-court judgment, her complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
 Cuevas’ complaint is premised on the theory that Chase securitized Cuevas’ loan 
after the mortgage and note were executed, but before the foreclosure action.  That theory 
draws on pure speculation.  Although Cuevas’ complaint incorporated a report that states 
it was authored by a “Certified Forensic Loan Auditor,” that report asserts only that the 
loan note “may have been sold, transferred, assigned and securitized” and that there was 
“no recorded assignment of mortgage.”  Complaint, Ex. A at 21, D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-1 
(emphasis added).  Even taking that allegation as true, such conclusory and speculative 
pleading cannot survive a motion to dismiss.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.   
 Cuevas’ Ninth and Tenth Counts—which are asserted under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act and the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 
respectively—at least in part arguably involved conduct unrelated to the inadequately 
pleaded securitization allegation.  However, those claims must fail as well.  Cuevas 
pleaded those claims with only conclusory allegations that lack sufficient facts to set out 
any potential statutory violation.   See id.  Moreover, the face of Cuevas’ complaint 
shows that she is not entitled to relief, as the facts as alleged show that she filed her 
federal suit after the statute of limitations had expired for an action brought under either 
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act.  See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2014); 12 U.S.C. § 2614 
(one year); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (three years); Complaint, ¶¶ 25-26, D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-5 
(alleging loan was executed on May 22, 2008). 
 These jurisdictional and pleading defects go to the heart of the action, and we are 
satisfied that any amendment to the complaint—which Cuevas did not request—would 
have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Also, we detect no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s inaction on Cuevas’ 
request for default before the named defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and in 
denying Cuevas’ motion to compel.  Finally, we reject Cuevas’ assertion that the District 
Court showed any bias in its decisions. 
 Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing Cuevas’ 
case with prejudice. 
